Imágenes y constructos: ¿pueden los correlatos neuronales del self ser revelados a través de análisis radiológico? by B. Klein, Stanley
 Images and Constructs: Can the 
Neural Correlates of Self be revealed 
through Radiological Analysis? 
Imágenes y constructos: ¿pueden los 
correlatos neuronales del self ser revelados a 
través de análisis radiológico?  
R e f l e x i v e      
Stanley B. Kleina,*,  
a Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, United States. 
 
 
 
 Article history: 
  
ARTICLE INFO 
 
Received: 20-08-2013 
Revised: 16-09-2013 
Accepted: 17-09-2013 
 ABSTRACT   
In this paper I argue that radiological attempts to elucidate the properties of self -- 
an endeavor currently popular in the social neurosciences -- are fraught with 
conceptual difficulties. I first discuss several philosophical criteria that increase the 
chances we are posing the “right” questions to nature. I then discuss whether these 
criteria are met when empirical efforts are directed at one of the central constructs 
in the social sciences – the human self. In particular, I consider whether recent 
attempts to map the neural correlates of self and its assumed properties using brain 
scanning technology satisfy the conceptual conditions minimally required to ask 
well-formed, theoretically satisfying questions of nature. I conclude that much 
theoretical work remains to be done. 
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RESUMEN     
En este artículo argumento que los intentos radiológicos para esclarecer las 
propiedades del Yo -  esfuerzo actualmente popular en las neurociencias sociales – 
están plagados de dificultades conceptuales. Primero discuto distintos criterios 
filosóficos que incrementan las probabilidades de  hacer las preguntas “correctas” a 
la naturaleza.  Luego discuto si estos criterios son encontrados cuando los 
esfuerzos empíricos están dirigidos a uno de los constructos centrales de las 
neurociencias sociales – el Yo.  En particular, tomo en cuenta si los intentos 
recientes de mapear las correlaciones neuronales del Yo y sus supuestas 
propiedades usando tecnología de escaneo cerebral satisfacen las condiciones 
conceptuales mínimamente requeridas para hacer preguntas bien formuladas y 
teóricamente satisfactorias de naturaleza. Concluyo que  mucho trabajo teórico 
necesita ser realizado. 
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In 1993 John Kihlstrom, Mike Gazzaniga 
and I organized a symposium at the annual meeting 
of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology. 
Our goal was to introduce a sampling of techniques 
from the emerging field of neuroscience and show 
how their adoption might help social and personality 
psychologists obtain a better understanding of the 
issues they grappled with – e.g., self, person 
memory, attribution theory, etc. (e.g., Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1998). Given the eclectic nature of our 
presentation, neither Kihlstrom nor I anticipated that 
shortly following its inception, social neuroscience 
would be co-opted by one particular methodology – 
radiological measures of neural structure and 
function.  In the early days of social neuroscience, 
the image held sway. What was not so clear was 
whether this was a good thing – a point I elaborate in 
this article. 
Fortunately, after a decade’s infatuation, this 
methodological myopia has begun to remit. A look 
through the table of contents of any recent volume of 
Social Cognitive Neuroscience or Social, Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience (the two primary outlets 
for social neuroscience) reveals a diversity of 
methodologies including, but not limited to, 
neuroimaging techniques, electrophysiological 
recording, brain lesion studies, and hormonal 
assays.  This is a good thing – it is what a 
neuroscience of social and personality psychology 
should be (e.g., Klein, Lax, & Gangi, 2010). But fMRI 
(the technological successor to PET, CAT and 
SPECT scans) still occupies a position of 
methodological dominance (as it also does in the 
cognitive neurosciences). 
In this article I call to question what data 
obtained from radiological measures allows us to 
conclude about theoretical constructs of interest in 
social and personality psychology. Specifically, 
building on concerns voiced by Uttal (2001), I argue 
that many of the constructs in the social 
neurosciences are seriously under-specified with 
regard to both the observational implications and 
conceptual aspects of theory. Accordingly, 
radiological attempts to map the relation between 
those constructs and their “neural correlates” suffer 
from conceptual ambiguity in addition to interpretive 
concerns that have been raised about the 
methodology, per se (e.g., Coltheart, 2006; Dumit, 
2004; Klein, 2010-a; Savoy, 2005; Uttal, 2001). Put 
differently, in the domain of neuroimaging, attempts 
to map observation to theory (so-called 
“correspondence rules”; e.g., Carnap, 1936) are 
plagued by serious issues that attenuate the force of 
the conclusions we can draw about the relation 
between psychological constructs and their neural 
instantiation (note: these concerns also apply to the 
use of radiological tools in the cognitive 
neurosciences). 
In this paper I focus on the “theory” side of 
the relational mapping. Readers interested in issues 
pertaining to methodology are referred to Dumit 
(2004) for a non-technical overview. To cut to the 
chase, conceptual under-specification characterizes 
many of the theory-based targets that radiological 
evidence is marshaled to address. This makes 
attempts to map the relation between construct and 
image an enterprise fraught with ambiguity 
(e.g., Klein & Gangi, 2010; Uttal, 2001). The 
scientific merit of neuroimaging analyses of 
constructs rests on the assumption –first voiced by 
Plato in his famous dialogue, Meno (e.g., Day, 
1994)– that the construct (receiving radiological 
attention) cuts nature at its joints. However, just 
because a scientist has a particular way of dividing 
the conceptual landscape does not guarantee that 
nature recognizes the theoretical distinctions he or 
she proposes. 
While there are many constructs in social 
and personality psychology I could discuss with 
regard to the issue just raised, I focus on one with 
which I have the most empirical and conceptual 
familiarity – the self. No less an authority than 
William James argued that the self is the 
fundamental unit of analysis for a science of mental 
life, the problem about which everything else 
revolves (1890). It would be hard to find a more 
psychologically propitious construct with which to 
illustrate my points. 
 
 
 
The scientific approach to understanding 
consists in asking questions of nature in the service 
of examining some provision or predicted 
consequence of a conceptually well-specified theory 
(e.g., Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Hanson, 1958; Klee, 
1997; Ladyman, 2002; Trusted, 1979). This 
questioning most often is accomplished by means of 
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experimentation.1 It is essential to keep in mind, 
however, that the scientific enterprise is more than 
the construction and interpretation of the 
observational offerings of well-designed 
experiments. As Heisenberg (1999) notes: “What we 
observe is not nature itself but nature exposed to our 
method of questioning” (p. 58) accordingly, asking 
the “right” question is critical to obtaining a solution 
to problems posed to nature. Add to these 
considerations the truism that “one has a better 
chance of finding what he or she seeks if one knows 
what it is he or she is looking for” and we have a 
concise statement of the basic considerations of 
scientific inquiry -- as well as its potential pitfalls. 
Questions need to be posed. But not just any 
questions – the “right” questions must be asked. 
And therein lays the rub. The idea that if we ask 
enough questions, nature will reveal her “truths”  -- 
an approach sometimes called the naïve Baconian 
empiricism – misrepresents of how science actually, 
or is supposed to, work (e.g., Klee, 1997; Newell, 
1973). Not any question will suffice: We need to 
pose the “right” questions to nature to distinguish 
fact from conjecture; that is, to cut nature at its 
seams. 
But, how do we know what constitutes the 
“right” question? The obvious answer is that theory 
guides our selection: A well-formulated theory 
grounds our empiricism by specifying what it is that 
we are looking for, as well as providing the 
experimental conditions necessary to ensure that the 
answers nature provides correspond to the 
questions posed (e.g., Brunswik, 
1947/1956; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Trusted, 1979).2 
Unfortunately, theoretical formalizations of the “its of 
interest” in the social neurosciences often are too 
1The role of the experimental method in science often is over-
simplified.  Contrary to popular belief (both lay and professional), 
there are no definitive experimental tests of the predictions of a 
theory, nor can any theories, by themselves, permit the 
formulation of specific observational predictions.  Such predictions 
require the theory under consideration be conjoined with a host of 
additional, interdependent assumptions, beliefs, guesses, 
metaphysical commitments as well as other theories (e.g., 
Hanson, 1958; Klee, 1997). 
2 Questions sometimes are asked in advance of the 
establishment of theory -- for example, when questioning is more 
exploratory than in the service of Popperian falsification (i.e., the 
hypothetical-deductive method of scientific inquiry; e.g., Ladyman, 
2002; Popper, 1963/2004). However, my concern is with 
empiricism in the service of testing existing theory rather than 
establishing it. 
 
under-specified to enable us to ascertain whether 
the questions we have asked nature are the “right” 
ones (e.g.,  Klein, 2013; Newell, 1973). 
The field of psychology is awash in data. 
What too often is lacking are overarching, 
nomologically sophisticated theories by which that 
data can attain conceptual relevance. Consequently, 
the it under analysis more often is stipulated than 
theoretically specified (e.g.,  Klein, 2013). 
Wittgenstein frames the problem in the following 
manner:  
The confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by its being a 
‘young science’; its state is not comparable with that 
of physics, for instance, in its beginnings…for in 
psychology, there are experimental methods and 
conceptual confusion.  The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think that we have 
the means of getting rid of the problems which 
trouble us; but problem and method pass one 
another by.  (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, A Fragment 
XIV, 371; emphasis in original).  
Fodor argues along similar lines:  
Psychological metatheory has remained 
seriously underdeveloped…a psychologist is likely to 
appeal his decisions about research strategies 
directly to general methodological principles to an 
extent to which a physicist of chemist does not…a 
consequence of the unsettled state of psychological 
metatheory is thus that schools of psychology are 
distinguished as much by the kinds of experiments 
that their adherents typically perform as by the 
theories they espouse.  (Fodor, 1968, p. xiv-xv).3 
In short, the social sciences suffer from a 
paucity of abstract formalizations capable of 
supporting the type of precise theory-based 
predictions and specifications found in most of the 
physical sciences (e.g., Klee, 1997; Klein, 
2013; Ladyman, 2002; Trusted, 1979; Wittgenstein, 
1953/2009). Absent a sophisticated network of 
nomological interdependencies between observation 
and theory (e.g., Margenau, 1950; Torgerson, 1958), 
social scientists are at a clear disadvantage when it 
3 These concerns were expressed, in part, as a response to the 
behaviorist influence on psychology.  Things have changed (in my 
opinion, for the better) since the behaviorist approach ceased to 
be the dominant orientation of psychological investigation.  
However, the critiques offered by Wittgenstein and Fodor 
unfortunately still are relevant to many psychological research 
programs (e.g., Klee, 1997). 
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comes to determining whether our experimental 
outcomes are commensurate with, or antithetical to, 
whatever theoretical topic is under examination 
(e.g., Newell, 1973). 
Take the self as our example. Its assumed 
properties and causal potencies typically are posited 
absent the conceptual treatment needed to ensure 
that our attempts at empirical explication ask the 
“right” questions (e.g., Klein, 2012a). As I will argue 
in the next section, conceptual confusion about what 
it is that we refer to by the word “self” makes it a 
priori impossible to know whether the answers 
nature offers in response to radiological interrogation 
provide insight into the construct under scrutiny. As 
Wittgenstein implies in the quote cited above, our 
experimental procedures may be telling us more 
about the task performed than the construct it is 
recruited to investigate. 
 
 
 
The self is perhaps the most familiar yet 
elusive aspect of human experience. It has captured 
the imagination of investigators and theoreticians 
from a vast and diverse array of academic 
disciplines and cultural traditions. For example, 
psychological treatments can be found in Allport 
(1961), Conway (2005), Freud (1949), Gergen 
(1971), James (1890), S. Klein 
(2001, 2010, 2012a), Leahy (1985), Leary and 
Tangney (2012), Lecky (1945), Legrand and Ruby 
(2009), Neisser (1988), Symonds (1951); 
philosophical treatments (both Western and Eastern) 
include Albahari (2006), Chadha (2013), Dainton 
(2008), Ganeri (2012), Ismael (2007), Jopling 
(2000), Lund (2005), Siderits (2003), Strawson 
(2009), Williams (1973), Yao (2005), Zahavi (2005); 
literary analyses are provided by Bruner 
(2002), Eakin (2008), Freeman (1991), King 
(2000), Parker (2007), and so on. As the reader 
likely is aware, this listing barely scratches the 
surface of the discourse and cross-disciplinary 
interest the self has attracted for more than 2,500 
years (e.g., Sorabji, 2006). But the point has been 
made – the self is one of the most heavily 
investigated and hotly debated concepts in the 
history of recorded human thought. 
So, what is a self?  To what does the term 
refer? As both psychologists and philosophers have 
made abundantly clear, a theoretically compelling 
answer is elusive at best (for review, see Klein, 
2012a). Klein and Gangi (2010) have proposed that 
Bertrand Russell’s (1912/1999) distinction between 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description (which actually traces from the work of 
Augustine of Hippo in his Confessions) provides a 
perspective on the difficulties we encounter when 
attempting to translate our everyday experience of 
self into descriptively satisfying theoretical terms. 
Russell proposed that we have knowledge by 
acquaintance when we know something via direct 
personal contact (sensory or introspective) and 
exhibit that knowledge by using appropriately 
referential terms when we communicate with others. 
As regards the self, this is seen in the ease with 
which we talk about the self as well as understand 
talk about self by others. 
But knowledge by acquaintance does not 
guarantee that we can capture that knowledge in 
descriptive form. When we attempt to make explicit 
what it is to which we refer – i.e., when we are asked 
to describe what the word “self” means — problems 
quickly arise. Despite more than 2,500 years 
devoted to the “problem of the self”, it has proven 
notoriously difficult to provide a set of propositions 
capable of transforming our acquired knowledge into 
a description of what a self is (e.g., 
Klein, 2010, 2012a). 
Some have argued that the reason there is a 
problem is that the question is based on a false 
premise -- the illusion that there is an elusive self to 
be explained (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Hood, 
2012; Hume, 1739-1740/1978; Metzinger, 
2009; Pessoa, Thompson, & Noe, 1998; for a critical 
discussion, see Siderits, Thompson, & Zahavi, 
2011). On this view, the issue of addressing the 
“right” question to nature becomes moot. There is no 
question in need of an answer. 
A difficulty with this idea that the self is an 
illusion is that an illusion is an experience, and an 
experience requires an experiencer (e.g., Klein, 
2012a; 2012b, in press; Schwerin, 2012; Strawson, 
2011; Zahavi, 2005). Accordingly, unless one wishes 
to maintain that an “experiencer” is something other 
than a self (which would be more a definitional 
stipulation than a conceptual entailment), this 
approach amounts to an exercise in begging the 
question. Meixner (2008) puts it bluntly, “The 
fictionalization of subjects of experience is 
incoherent, since it involves the incoherent idea that 
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I, for example, am an illusion of myself” (p. 
162). Kant (1781/1998) goes further, arguing that the 
self of subjective awareness (his transcendental 
ego) must accompany experience (for related views, 
see James, 1890; Lund, 2005). 
Despite concerns about the self’s ontological 
status, psychologists have not shown any reluctance 
to put the term to work in an abundance of self-
hyphenated compounds (e.g., self-comparison, self-
concept, self-complexity, self-deception, self-
esteem, self-handicapping, self-image, self-
perception, self-regulation, self-reference, self-
verification; for reviews see Kihlstrom et al., 
1988; Leary & Tangney, 2012). But, the question 
remains: What is it that is being verified, 
conceptualized, complicated, esteemed, deceived, 
verified, regulated, and handicapped? Unfortunately, 
the focus of these research agendas rests firmly on 
the entries on the right-hand side of the hyphenated 
relation -- to the detriment of our understanding of 
the self in terms of its properties and causal 
potencies (for discussions see 
Klein, 2010, 2012a; Klein & Gangi, 2010). 
Despite these ontological concerns (and 
other, more serious, ones discussed below), models 
of the self have been on display in psychology for 
over 100 years (e.g., Calkins, 1915; Conway, 
2005; Greenwald, 1981; James, 1890; Kihlstrom & 
Klein, 1994; Neisser, 1988; Samsonovich & Nadel, 
2005; Stuss, 1991). Yet, the elusive nature of the 
construct has resulted in most of these offerings 
concentrating on the task of explicating the “self” in 
its assumed causal or foundational relation to a 
specific set of predicates, processes and contexts 
(c.f., Leary & Tangney, 2012; Sedikides & Brewer, 
2001). We thus find models of contextualized selves, 
cultural selves, social selves, cognitive selves, 
embodied selves, situational selves, 
autobiographical selves, relational selves, narrative 
selves, collective selves, etc.  But consideration of 
what the self is that serves as the assumed bedrock 
for these cultural, social, cognitive and narrative 
instantiations has been vastly under-specified (for 
discussion, see S. Klein & Gangi, 2010; S. 
Klein, 2010, in press). 
Conceptual difficulties surrounding the term 
“self” are not restricted to psychology. The “problem 
of the self” has been intensely debated in philosophy 
and theology (both Western and Eastern) for more 
than 25 centuries (for review, see Sorabji, 2006). 
The ongoing, multi-disciplinary nature of these (often 
contentious) examinations of the self (for 
discussions, see Baillie, 1993; Flanagan, 
2002; Gallagher & Shear, 1999; Giles, 
1997; Johnstone, 1970; Siderits et al., 
2011; Vierkant, 2003) has left some wondering 
whether a conceptual understanding of self is 
possible in practice (e.g., Olson, 1999) or in principle 
(e.g., McGinn, 1991). 
 
 
 
One reason for many of the difficulties we 
face when attempting to describe what we mean by 
the word “self” is that there is not a single self to 
describe (e.g., Klein, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2012a, in 
press; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 
2002; Klein, Rozendal, & Cosmides, 2002; Legrand 
& Ruby, 2009; Neisser, 1988; Stern, 1985). Rather, 
two ideas of the self are involved in almost every 
discussion of the topic, although these ideas rarely 
are separated. On this analysis -- reviewed at length 
in S. Klein (2012a, in press) -- the self meaningfully 
can be partitioned into two distinct, but normally 
interacting, aspects – the neurally instantiated 
systems of self-knowledge and the self of first-
person subjectivity (e.g., James, 1890; Legrand and 
Ruby, 2009; Strawson, 2009; Zahavi, 1999, 2005). 
While it is well beyond the scope of this 
paper to go into detail about these two aspects of 
self (extensive discussion can be found in S. Klein, 
2012a, in press), the reader can, if it helps, treat 
them as “roughly” analogous to James’s (1890) self-
as-known and self-as-knower (see Klein, in press, 
for the reason scare quotes bracket the word 
“roughly”). These two aspects of self cannot be 
deduced from, or reduced to, a single, underlying 
principle, structure, process, substance or system 
(e.g., Kant, 1781/1998; Klein, 2012a, in 
press; Zahavi, 2005).4 One – the neuro-cognitive 
systems of the psycho-physical person (consisting of 
such things as personal memory, body image, 
emotions) – is materially (primarily neurally) 
instantiated and therefore capable of being 
apprehended and treated as an object of scientific 
inquiry. The other – the self of first-person 
4 Theoretical considerations and empirical findings that, I believe, 
offer strong support for the position that these two aspects or 
types of self are not reducible, one to the other -- that is, they are 
not different ways of thinking about a single entity – are presented 
in S. Klein (2012, in press). 
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subjectivity – is the subject having the experience, 
rather than the object of that experience. Logically, 
this entails that it cannot be directly known by acts of 
perception or introspection (e.g., Earle, 1972; Kant, 
1781/1998; Klein, 2012a; Lund, 2005; Swinburne, 
1997, 2013; for a different view, see Strawson, 
2009). Our knowledge of the self of subjectivity is a 
matter of acquaintance or feeling, not something that 
can be treated as the object of descriptive analysis 
(e.g., Kant, 1781/1998;  Klein, 2012a, in 
press; Nagel, 1974). 
Despite differences in ontological status, 
under normal circumstances these two aspects of 
self interact, and this interaction is a prerequisite for 
our acquaintance with our self. Indeed, it is only via 
their interaction that a particular form of 
consciousness – self-awareness —becomes 
possible (these assertions are treated extensively 
in Klein, 2012a, in press). Following Fitche’s dictum, 
there can be no subject without an object or an 
object without a subject (e.g., Neuhouser, 1990). 
These arguments have important 
consequences for the “self” as an object of scientific 
inquiry. Considerable progress has been made 
describing the cognitive and neurological bases of 
the self of neuro-cognitive instantiation 
(e.g., Conway, 2005; Kihlstrom & Klein, 
1994, 1997; Klein, 2010; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & 
Chance, 2002; Neisser, 1988; Samsonovich & 
Nadel, 2005). This is because the neuro-cognitive 
bases of self-knowledge can be (and have been) 
objectified, and thus are amenable to scientific 
analysis. 
The self of first-person subjectivity, by 
contrast, is too poorly understood to bear the 
definitional weight required to stand in a meaningful 
causal relation between the self and its predicates 
(e.g., regulation, image, conception, complexity, 
handicapping, verification, etc.). Moreover, as 
discussed below, treating the subjective self as an 
object has the scientifically unhappy consequence of 
stripping it of its core feature – i.e., its subjectivity. 
Not surprisingly, many researchers 
(intentionally or otherwise) avoid these difficulties by 
relying on readers’ familiarity with the term “self” -- 
derived from years of knowledge by acquaintance -- 
to confer a (false) sense of confidence that he or she 
knows what it is to which the author refers. But the 
problem remains – in terms of a descriptive, 
theoretical analysis, we remain unclear what it is we 
refer to when we apply the label “self”. 
Compounding the problem, researchers 
often fail to appreciate that the self of subjectivity is 
not the object of their experimental studies 
(e.g., Klein, in press; Klein & Nelson, 2014). Nor 
could it be. Objectivity is based on the assumption 
that an act or object exists independent of any 
individual’s awareness of it (e.g., Earle, 
1955; Martin, 2008; Nagel, 1974; Rescher, 1997); it 
is something other than the self. When objectivity is 
the stance adopted by the self to study itself, the self 
must, of necessity, be directed toward what is not 
the self -- to some “other” that serves as the self’s 
object (e.g., Earle, 1972; Husserl, 1964; Lund, 
2005;  Klein, 2012a, in press; Zahavi, 2005). Thus, 
to study myself as an object, I must transform myself 
into an “other”, into a “not-self”. Accordingly, the 
subjective self is not, and cannot, be an object for 
itself and still maintain its subjectivity. Paradoxically, 
the subjective aspect of self can achieve objectivity 
only at the cost of forfeiting its essence as a 
subjective center (e.g., Klein, 2012a). This remains 
the case whether investigation is conducted by first-
person introspection or third person observation: 
Once apprehended by first-person subjectivity (one’s 
own or that of another person), the subjective self 
becomes an object in the manner all objects (both 
mental and physical) must, of necessity, become 
when apprehended (e.g., Husserl, 1964). In the 
process, the subjective core of the self of first-person 
experience is lost. 
These ideas have considerable resonance 
with the philosophical position, first voiced by 19th 
century philosopher Franz Brentano (1995) that 
consciousness is, of logical necessity, intentional. 
The term “intentionality”, with regard to conscious 
experience, means that the consciousness must be 
about some object or idea other than itself -- it must 
have an object (whether physical or mental). 
Consciousness, absent its object, is opaque to 
experience whether that experience is felt, 
introspected or perceptually given (see also James, 
1890; Kant, 1781/1998; Klein, 2012a; Lund, 
2005; Zahavi, 2005). Returning to the self, its 
subjective aspect, devoid of an intentional object, 
cannot be apprehended regardless of whether that 
apprehension depends on personal acquaintance or 
logical inference.5  
5 It merits mention that various Eastern wisdom traditions take 
issue with this position, arguing it is possible, with sufficient 
training, to attain a state of “pure” consciousness (i.e., 
consciousness absent an object; for review, see Forman, 1990). 
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The subjectivity of self thus seems a poor candidate 
for scientific exploration (radiological or otherwise), 
an enterprise predicated on understanding the 
behavior and dispositions of objects in relation to 
underlying theory (e.g., Hanson, 1958; Klee, 
1997; Ladyman, 2002; Quine, 1951). Science trades 
in the world of publically observable and physically 
measureable objects and events (e.g., Earle, 
1955; Margenau, 1950; Rescher, 1997). 
Correspondence rules play an important role in this 
enterprise, providing the mechanism by which 
investigators can construct logically defensible 
mappings of observables to theory (e.g., Carnap, 
1936). Despite attracting the critical attention of 
philosophers (e.g., Hempel, 1965), this approach 
continues to have considerable influence in the 
social sciences – psychology in particular (e.g., Klee, 
1997). For the subjective self to become part of the 
scientific world it has to relinquish its subjectivity. But 
then we no longer are investigating the subjective 
properties our research has been designed to 
illuminate. To maintain its identity, the subjective self 
cannot be transformed into an object (e.g., Kant, 
1781/1998; Klein, 2012a; Zahavi, 2005). And, 
absent an objective instantiation, the rules of 
correspondence cannot be applied in any 
straightforward manner, thus making it hard to see 
how scientifically defensible questions about this 
aspect of the self can be formulated. 
In contrast to the subjective aspect of self, 
the neurally instantiated aspects can, in virtue of 
their materiality, be submitted to a scientifically 
viable descriptive analysis. However, even here 
problems exist, a number of which are detailed in S. 
Klein (in press). For our purposes, the key concern 
is that investigators too often fail to appreciate that 
the objective aspect of self admits to a multiplicity of 
constituents. 
As one example, within the domain of self-
referential memory, research has revealed at least 
three different types of self-knowledge that cut both 
across and within systems of long-term memory – 
i.e., episodic personal memories, semantic factual 
self-knowledge and semantic trait self-knowledge 
(for recent reviews, see Klein & Gangi, 2010; Klein & 
Lax, 2010; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 
2013; Picard et al., 2013; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 
in press; Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, 
& Levine, 2012). These memory-based aspects of 
self are both conceptually and functionally 
independent (e.g., Klein & Gangi, 2010; Klein & Lax, 
2010; Renoult et al., 2012). Consequently, one must 
take considerable care when attempting to map the 
memorial properties of the self onto its assumed 
neural correlates: It matters greatly which memory-
based aspect of the self is hypothesized to mediate 
the phenomena (physical and/or mental) under 
investigation. 
Moreover, it is well-known (e.g., Klein & 
Loftus, 1993; for review see Klein, Robertson, 
Gangi, & Loftus, 2008) that the same experimental 
outcome can be mediated by more than one system 
of self-memory. For example, judgments about a 
trait’s self-relevance can be accomplished by either 
semantic or episodic memory, the contributions of 
each determined in large part by the amount of 
experience one has with the trait being judged (e.g., 
Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992). Further 
complicating matters, under certain conditions 
judgments about a trait’s self–relevance can 
simultaneously activate episodic and semantic 
systems of self-knolwedge (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, 
& Chance 2001, 2002). Unfortunately, most recent 
attempts at the radiological localization of trait 
knowledge (both self and other) are uniformed by 
such considerations (e.g., Ma et al., 2013). 
Thus, conclusions based on radiological 
analyses of trait self-judgments can, and, as we will 
see below, often do provide multiple, non-
overlapping localizations unless correlated factors 
(e.g., trait-relevant behavioral experience) are 
carefully controlled. Unfortunately, to the best of my 
knowledge, brain scanning studies of trait self-
judgments – of which a number exist (e.g., Craik et 
al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae, Morgan, 
Heatheron, Banfiled & Kelley, 2004) -- have yet to 
take such precautions. 
 
 
 
Asking the “right” of nature question requires 
we be clear about the properties (both observable 
and theoretical) of the concept toward which our 
questions are directed. This, in turn, depends on the 
availability of a well-formulated conceptual analysis 
of the it under investigation. 
In the case of the “self”, theoretical 
formalization often is lacking or seriously under-
specified, leading researchers to rely, to an 
uncomfortable degree, on pre-theoretical 
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commitments (based largely on personal 
acquaintance) as a way of compensating for the lack 
of consensually shared, conceptually sophisticated 
theory (e.g., Klein, 2012a, 2013). Formulating the 
“right” questions to address to nature is particularly 
problematic when the it under investigation is not 
only theoretically under-specified (e.g., Klein, 
2012a; Olson, 1999) but also considered (at least by 
some) to be existentially questionable (e.g., Hood, 
2012; Hume, 1739-1740/1978; Metzinger, 2009). 
Adding to these difficulties, one aspect of 
the self (its subjectivity) may not be amenable to 
description by a conceptually satisfying set of 
operational or theoretic propositions even if 
existential concerns are shown to be misguided. The 
problem is twofold. First, transforming the subject 
into an object of experience (a process required for 
its apprehension) has the effect of stripping the 
subject of its core subjectivity. The second, related, 
issue involves the intentionality of consciousness 
(e.g., Brentano, 1995; Textor, 2013). Applied to 
imaging studies, the intentionality of consciousness 
makes it logically impossible to ascertain whether 
the neural systems identified via radiological 
analysis of self-consciousness reflect the activity of 
(a) the self as subject, (b) the self as the object of 
subjectivity, (c) an object of subjectivity other than 
self, (d) all of the above, or (e) none of the above 
(these concerns apply to any attempt to identify the 
neural correlates of consciousness). As it will be 
detailed in the next section, radiological attempts to 
localize the neural substrates of self-reflection are 
especially problematic due to the inherent confound 
between the act of reflection and its object. 
With regard to the neuro-cognitive aspects 
of self, a primary obstacle to radiological analysis 
concerns the failure of most investigators to provide 
reason to believe that they are familiar with the 
complexities of the systems under examination. As 
noted previously, at least six different, functionally 
independent systems of self-knowledge have been 
identified; and within those systems a variety of 
subsystems have been found – many of which also 
are functionally independent (for recent reviews, 
see Klein & Lax, 2010; Martinelli et al., 
2013; Renoult et al., 2012). 
At least this problem has a clear path to 
resolution. But until steps toward increased 
familiarity with the complexities of the neuro-
cognitive self are evidenced, the conclusions of 
radiological analyses of the “self” continue to read 
more like mappings of “technology to terminology” 
than mappings of “technology to theory”. 
As if that were not enough cause for 
concern, it also must be remembered that some 
investigators contend that the self is an illusion 
(e.g., Hood, 2012; Metzinger, 2009), or, if it does 
exists, it is beyond our capacity to (descriptively) 
know (e.g., McGinn, 1991). Such sentiments do not 
bode well for radiological analyses -- it is logically 
impossible to neurally localize constructs that either 
lie outside our conceptual reach, or do not exist in 
the first place. 
In sum, even if the it of our investigations is 
not an illusion, it certainly is elusive (e.g., Klein, in 
press; Lewis, 1982). In the following section I 
discuss some implications of the conceptual issues 
surrounding the concept of “self” for social 
neuroscience’s attempts to map its neural 
substrates. 
 
 
 
The first examination of self using brain scan 
technology was conducted by Craik et al. (1999). 
Since that beginning, the number of radiological 
investigations of the self has been so prolific that not 
long after Craik et al’s (1999) initial foray it already 
made sense to conduct meta-analytic reviews of the 
accumulated data (e.g., Northoff et al., 2006). And, 
judging by the number of publications that have 
appeared in just the past 5 years, interest in 
radiological approaches to self shows no evidence of 
waning. Indeed, the literature has grown so 
explosively that there now exist specialized meta-
analyses devoted to questions within sub-domains of 
self research (e.g., the meta-analysis of fMRI studies 
of self-other judgments; Denny, Kober, Wager, & 
Ocshner, 2012) 
Rather than attempt an exhaustive review of 
this voluminous literature (good luck to anyone brave 
enough to take on that assignment!), I focus my 
comments on a sampling of papers purporting either 
to “locate the self in the brain” or to “examine the 
neurological basis of self-reflection”. Although I just 
as easily could have examined radiological studies 
of the neural underpinnings of self-knowledge 
(e.g., Moran, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2013; Ochsner et 
al., 2005), self-referential thought (e.g., Abraham, 
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2013; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 
2001; Leshikar & Duarte, 2013), the self-concept 
(e.g., Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004; Kim & 
Johnson, 2010), self/other differences (e.g., Chen, 
Wagner, Kelley, Powers, & Heatherton, 2013), trait 
self-knowledge (e.g., Ma et al., 2013), self-regulation 
(e.g., Beauregard, Lévesque, & Bourgouin, 
2001: Heatherton, 2011), etc., the two topics I 
address have the advantage of being particularly 
clear examples of the conceptual confusion that 
typifies most radiological studies of self.  
A. Finding the Self: From its inception, 
radiological studies of the self have been attempting 
to locate it in the brain (e.g., Craik et al., 
1999; Kelley et al., 2002). Originally broad in their 
objectives (i.e., finding the self; for reviews 
see Gillihan & Farah, 2005 and Northoff et al., 
2006), several recent efforts have narrowed their 
search parameters, focusing on contextualized 
aspects of self (e.g., the depressive self; 
e.g., Lemogne et al., 2009). 
But is the question “where in the brain is the 
self?” the right question to ask of nature? Judging 
from the proliferation of scanning studies that have 
attempted such localization (for review, see Northoff 
et al., 2006), researchers apparently believe that is. 
However, as I hope I have made clear, there is no 
self– either neurally or conceptually -- to be 
localized. Rather, there are at least two aspects of 
self – the objective and subjective -- and within the 
former, at least six functionally independent sub-
systems have been identified (e.g., S. 
Klein, 2010, 2012a; Martinelli et al., 2013; Picard et 
al., 2013). Thus, the self is not a thing capable of 
localization: Rather it consists in a set of contents, 
qualities, functions and aspects, not all of which are 
amenable to scientific investigation (see the section 
“The Self as the Object of Scientific Inquiry” for 
discussion). Small wonder meta-analytic 
assessments of the success of localization via 
imaging technologies have thus far been 
disappointing (e.g., Klein et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 
2006; Ruby & Legrand, 2007). 
Considered in a more positive light, the 
studies seem to be telling us is that the self is not a 
single thing amenable to neural localization. If 
investigators had a more sensitive appreciation of 
this multiplicity, their attempts to map construct to 
observation presumably would be more nuanced 
and circumscribed. Unfortunately, with very few 
exceptions (e.g., Gillihan & Farah, 2005), discourse 
found in articles attempting to locate “the” self has 
been concerned primarily with methodological and 
anatomical issues. Theoretical considerations 
relevant to the conceptual target of investigation, in 
contrast, are typically accorded cursory treatment 
(you can confirm this for yourself by taking a look at 
any of the articles I have cited as examples of the 
radiological analysis of "self-in-the-brain” or “self-
reflection”. Non-cited papers on these – and other – 
topics involving radiological investigation of the self 
evidence a similar imbalance in attention given to 
method and theory). 
This is a serious problem for the successful 
conduct of a scientific investigation of nature. As I 
hope I have shown, the specificity with which the 
constructs we submit to scanning capture the 
essence of what they are intended to describe 
carries at least as much weight as do 
methodological questions concerning the specificity 
with which radiological techniques reveal the neural 
activity assumed to be correlated with the construct 
of interest (for discussions of the latter point, 
see Miller et al,. 2002; Uttal, 2001; Vul, Harris, 
Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009). 
B. The Neural Localization of Self-
Reflection: Radiological studies of cortical 
involvement in the act of self-reflection also have 
been the subject of considerable attention 
(e.g., Herwig, Kaffenberger, Schell, Jancke, & Bruhl, 
2012; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011; Johnson, Nolan-
Hoeksema, Mitchell, & Levin, 2009; Johnson et al., 
2006). And, as was the case with attempts to “find 
the self”, studies devoted to uncovering the neural 
underpinnings of self-reflection often contain little, if 
any, discussion of conceptual and philosophical 
issues associated with their presumed target. 
Rather, almost all attention is focused on questions 
pertaining to methodology and neuroanatomy. 
This is particularly troubling given the fact 
that serious conceptual issues argue against either 
the logical or empirical possibility of separating the 
subjective aspects of the self from its more objective 
aspects. To the extent that self-reflection absent an 
object of reflection is a logical impossibility (i.e., the 
intentionality problem), there is no principled way of 
identifying whether enhanced neural activity during 
self-reflection maps neural activity associated with 
(a) the object(s) of subjectivity,  (b) subjectivity per 
se, (c) both, or (d) neither. 
In addition, ontological issues raised earlier 
in this paper argue against the possibility of 
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subjectivity being taken as an object of scientific 
inquiry (at least if that inquiry requires the current 
scientific “gold standards” of objectification and 
quantification).The first-person aspect of self forfeits 
its subjectivity when treated as an object of 
awareness. In effect, the attempt to “picture” 
subjectivity has the consequence of the stripping the 
image of its connection with the aspect of self (i.e., 
subjectivity) it was designed to address. Assuming 
that some neural structures are likely to be 
differentially active during self-reflection, what do 
those differences tell us? Some strong philosophical 
arguments are needed before we even can begin to 
formulate an answer. And such arguments are hard 
to find (see Legrand & Ruby, 2009, for one 
particularly salient exception). 
 
 
 
Either you know what you are looking for, 
and then there is no problem, or you do not know 
what you are looking for, and then you cannot 
expect to find it. Without a nuanced, conceptually 
sophisticated analysis to guide our empiricism, 
asking the “right” questions of nature becomes a 
daunting task. And, absent the “right” questions, the 
answers nature provides are unlikely to instill a 
rationally justifiable sense of confidence that its 
joints have conceptually been severed. 
The issues raised in this paper have been 
addressed to interpretive ambiguities characterizing 
the relation between image and theory in the social 
neurosciences. However, the same considerations 
apply with roughly equal force to other 
methodologies: Any attempt to map physical 
observation to abstract theory requires that attention 
be given in at least equal measure to both sides of 
the mapping. Indeed, I suggest that the balance 
should be shifted toward theory when the 
observational side of the mapping involves 
radiological measures. There are several reasons for 
this. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that most 
social and cognitive neuroscientists view psycho-
neural identity theory (e.g., Place, 1956) and its 
variants as metaphysical dogma (for review and 
discussion, see Churchland, 1986; Kirk, 2003; 
Klein, in press). Conjoined with the reductionist 
approach of Western science (e.g., Bickle, 2003), 
identity theory has considerable potential to 
(mis)lead researcher and reader alike to assume an 
equivalence between construct and observation: i.e., 
that the neural structures activated during 
radiological analysis are in some (unspecified) way 
coextensive with the construct under consideration. 
With regard to the self, it appears that the temptation 
is strong to assume that when looking at images of 
the brain we are looking at the self.  But, it is one 
thing to argue that neural activity is correlated with 
mental activity, and quite another to presume the 
two are coextensive. 
In my experience, experimental treatments 
of the self (as well as many other constructs of 
interest in the social sciences) too often rely on folk-
psychological familiarity (i.e., Russell’s “knowledge 
by acquaintance”) to compensate for the absence of 
well-specified, theoretical treatments of the construct 
under consideration (Klein, 2013). If this assessment 
is accurate (and I think that it is), things need to 
change. Absent clear theoretical guidance, the 
relation between observation and construct is 
difficult, if not impossible, to state with any 
conceptual warrant. We need to know not only what 
our experimental operations entail but also what the 
underlying constructs they are assumed to elucidate 
consist in. And nowhere is that more important than 
in neuroimaging studies, where the image runs the 
serious risk of being taken for the construct 
(e.g., Dumit, 2004; Klein, 2010-b; Uttal, 2001).6 
So, what can be done? One possible 
remedial step would be to require researchers who 
study the self to step out of their comfort zone. 
Rather than assume their readers are familiar with 
what it means to be a self, authors should make 
explicit the manner in which they use the term -- that 
is, they need to provide explicit, theory-based 
treatments of how the term “self” is being 
conceptualized in the research under consideration. 
Otherwise, the term runs the very real risk of being 
reduced to little more than a place holder in a two-
term relation (e.g., self-hyphen-topic of interest) or to 
a contextually limited meaning (e.g., cultural self, 
regulative self, narrative self) — its use predicated 
6 The critiques raised in this paper are quite specific and should 
not be taken as a global indictment of the use of radiological 
measures in social neuroscience.  Insights obtained from a neural 
level of analysis can, and should, inform research at the 
psychological level (e.g., Polster, Nadel, & Schacter, 1991). For 
example, scanning studies that offered convergent evidence for 
the functional independence of the proposed constituents of a 
model of the self (e.g., Klein, 2012a) are a welcome contribution 
to existing theory and an appropriate use of radiological 
technology (e.g., Klein, 2010a).  The work of Martinelli and 
colleagues (e.g., Martinelli et al., 2013) is exemplary in this 
regard. 
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on the researcher’s conviction that the reader, by 
virtue of his or her personal acquaintance and social 
convention, will not worry about the self’s function, 
role, or possible reality. 
Philosophy, as I see it, also plays a crucial 
role as we try to come to grips with the issues I have 
raised. In our haste to stake out a claim as an 
independent, empirically-based, science some 150 
years ago (by 1870 the borders between philosophy 
and psychology already were beginning to be clearly 
drawn), psychology has strayed too far from its 
philosophical roots in Departments of Natural 
Science/Philosophy. It is time we reclaimed some of 
the ground lost during the birthing process. 
While it would be unwise to accuse 
philosophy of having resolved many of the questions 
with which it grapples, it certainly is the case that 
philosophers can help psychologists to (a) see what 
questions need to be asked, (b) identify when 
questions are well-formed and internally consistent, 
and (c) determine whether interpretation of an 
outcome is plausible with regard to its logical 
coherence as well as its empirical constraints (for 
discussion, see Craver, 2007). 
On the flip side, there clearly is a need for 
philosophers to pay greater attention to findings from 
psychology.  Careful consideration of psychological 
empiricism offers an important means by which 
philosophers can constrain theories based largely on 
notions of conceivability and logical coherence.  
Psychological findings can provide grounding for 
philosophers trying to transition conceivability to 
empirical possibility (e.g., Wilkes, 1988). 
As it currently stands, philosophy has the 
advantage in the endeavor to close the 
interdisciplinary gap: A number of philosophers 
already have taken steps to naturalize their subject 
matter by drawing on findings from the psychological 
sciences (e.g., Flanagan, 2002;  Klein & Nichols, 
2012; Knobe & Nichols, 2008). It is time for 
psychology to reciprocate — to take advantage of 
the substantial resources philosophy has to offer. 
We need to work in earnest to close the gap we 
created between these academic siblings, whose 
separation was based more on personal, pragmatic 
and political reasons than pedagogic concerns. 
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